Tag Archives: anchoring

Do You Accept Bad Deals?

Taya Cohen

Taya Cohen

Agreement bias is the tendency to agree (“settle”) in a negotiation even if the outcome is disadvantageous to one participant.

During negotiation, each participant’s positions and interests may differ.
Skillful negotiators usually end the discussion if they determine that a stalemate is likely.

Leigh Thompson

Leigh Thompson

Negotiators may accept a disadvantageous deal for reasons besides personality traits, explained Carnegie Mellon’s Taya Cohen and Leigh Thompson of Northwestern with University of Toronto’s Geoffrey J. Leonardelli.

◦       Sunk Costs: Participants may wish to achieve any resolution, to derive some sense of value for the invested time and effort (“sunk costs”),

◦       Image: Negotiators may wish to appear likeable,

◦       Erroneous Anchoring Assumption: People may assume that their interests and the negotiation partner’s are mutually exclusive instead of investigating an integrative solution.

◦       Strength in Numbers: Negotiators who are outnumbered by the other negotiation team tend to agree to suboptimal deals.

Geoffrey J Leonardelli

Geoffrey J Leonardelli

Solo negotiators demonstrated more agreeable behavior, and were more likely to agree to unfavourable conditions.
When solo negotiators were joined by only one person, they avoided unfavourable agreements.

Douglas Jackson

Douglas Jackson

Agreement bias occurs even in anonymous surveys, reported Douglas Jackson, then of Educational Testing Services and Penn State.
This acquiescence bias, is triggered when people agree to survey items no matter the content.

Samuel Messick

Samuel Messick

Social desirability concern can accelerate agreements in negotiations, surveys, and life, found  Jackson and his ETS colleague Samuel Messick, in their factor analysis of Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) items.

Robin Pinkley

Robin Pinkley

Inaccurate judgments of possible settlement options can lead also to unfavourable agreements, noted SMU’s Robin L. Pinkley, Terri L. Griffith of Santa Clara University, and University of Illinois’s Gregory B. Northcraft.

Terri Griffith

Terri Griffith

Pinkley’s group demonstrated ineffective outcomes when negotiators :

  • Accurately processed inaccurate or incomplete information
    (information availability errors),
  • Inaccurately processed valid or complete information
    (information processing errors).
Gregory Northcraft

Gregory Northcraft

-*How do you avoid agreeing to bad deals?

-*How do you reduce Information Availability Errors and Information Processing Errors?

RELATED POSTS:

©Kathryn Welds

Range Offers vs Point Offers for Better Negotiation Settlements

Daniel Ames

Daniel Ames

Many people avoid making negotiation offers as a range of values, because they expect that co-negotiators will “anchor” on the range’s lower value or higher value. 

Malia F Mason

Malia F Mason

However, range offers led to stronger outcomes in experiments by Columbia University’s Daniel R. Ames and Malia F. Mason.
This team suggested that these “dual anchors” signal a negotiator’s value awareness and politeness.

Range offers and point offers have varying impacts, depending on the proposer’s perceived preparation, believability, respectfulness, and reasonableness.

Negotiators’ credibility, interpersonal style, and understanding of value  were associated with the anchor value’s influence on agreements.

Ames and Mason tested three types of negotiation proposal ranges:

  • Bolstering Range in which the target point value as the bottom of the range and an aspirational value as the top of the range.
    This strategy usually yields generous counteroffers and higher settlement prices. They recommend using Bolstering Range Offers in negotiations.  
  • Backdown Range features the target point value as the upper end of the range and a concession value as the lower offer.
    This approach often leads to accepting the lower value and they do not recommend this approach.
  • Bracketing Range includes the target point offer and often has neutral settlement outcomes for the offer-maker.
    This tactic can be perceived by co-negotiators as more collaborative and less aggressive.
Martin Schweinsberg

Martin Schweinsberg

Extreme anchors are often seen as aggressive and unrealistic, may lead to negotiation breakdown, according to INSEAD’s Martin Schweinsberg with Gillian Ku of London Business School, collaborating with Cynthia S. Wang of University of Michigan, and National University of Singapore’s Madan M. Pillutla.
Even experienced, skillful negotiators said they were offended by extreme offers.
Likewise, less capable negotiators were more likely to walk away from these negotiations.

Gilliam Ku

Gilliam Ku

Point offers and range offers operated independently and interacted to  influence settlement values. 
They concluded that Bolstering Range Offers imply the co-negotiator’s reservation price and can positively influence negotiation outcomes, whereas Precise Offers influence the perception of offer credibility

  • When do you present a precise negotiation offer instead of a negotiation range?

RELATED POSTS:

Nothing to Lose: Effective Negotiating Even When “Powerless”

Michael Schaerer

Most negotiators prefer to have a “fall back position.”
However INSEAD’s Michael Schaerer and Roderick Swaab with Adam Galinsky of Columbia found that having no alternatives and less power than co-negotiators can improve outcomes.

A weak alternative can establish an unfavourably modestanchor point,according to Hebrew University’s late Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman of Princeton.

Adam Galinsky
Adam Galinsky

These “lowball” first offers usually undermine a negotiator’s final outcome.

Professional athletes and their agents provided examples of negotiating better deals when they had no “back up” offers and “nothing to lose.”  They set more ambitious anchor points, and often negotiate a more favourable settlement.

Amos Tversky
Amos Tversky

Schaerer and team asked a hundred people whether they would prefer to negotiate a job offer with a weak alternate offer or without any alternative.
More than 90 percent of participants preferred an unattractive alternative offer, confirming that any alternative is usually seen as better than no alternative.

Schaerer asked volunteers to sell previously-owned music when they had:

  • No offers (no alternative),
  • One offer at USD $2 (weak alternative),
  • A bid at USD $8 (strong alternative).
Roderick Swaab
Roderick Swaab

Volunteers in each group proposed a first offer, and rated the degree of power they felt.
People with the “strong” alternative felt most powerful and those with no alternative felt least powerful.

Volunteers with a weak alternative felt more powerful than those with no alternative, but they made lower first offers.
This indicated that they had less confidence than participants with no alternative.

Conclusion: Having any alternative can help people feel powerful but can undermine negotiation performance.

Schaerer’s team asked a volunteer to “sell” a coffee mug to a potential “buyer,” who was a confederate of the researchers.

The volunteer “seller” received a phone call from “another buyer,” who was a confederate of the researchers, before the volunteer seller met the original potential buyer.
When half the “sellers” met the original purchase prospect, the “buyer” made a low offer.
The “buyer” declined to bid for the other half of “sellers.”

Daniel Kahneman
Daniel Kahneman

Sellers without an alternative offer said they felt less powerful, but made higher first offers and received significantly higher sales prices than negotiators with an unattractive alternative.

In another situation, half of the “sellers” concentrated on available alternatives (none, weak, or strong) and the remaining negotiators focused on the target price.

Volunteers with unappealing alternatives negotiated worse deals than those with no options when they focused on alternatives.
“Sellers” avoided this pitfall by concentrating on the target price.
Conclusion:  Focus on the goal when alternatives are weak.

Negotiators with non-existent or unappealing alternatives can set audacious goals and make an ambitious opening offer because they have “nothing to lose.”
This strategy usually renders better results for the disadvantaged negotiator.

  • How do you overcome lowball anchoring when you have few negotiation alternatives?

RELATED POSTS:

©Kathryn Welds

Precise Negotiation Offers Yield Better Bargaining Results

Malia F Mason

Malia F Mason

Opening negotiation offers usually anchor the discussion and shape settlement values.
Many people make opening offers in “round” numbers like USD$10 instead of “precise” numbers like USD$9.
This strategy rendered less effective results in negotiation experiments, reported Columbia’s Malia Mason, Alice J. Lee, Elizabeth A. Wiley, and Daniel Ames.

Y Charles Zhang

Y Charles Zhang

Negotiators can improve negotiation outcomes by specifying offers in precise values because they more potently anchor the negotiation range.
In addition, negotiators who proposed precise offers were perceived as more confident, credible, and “well-informed” regarding actual value.

Norbert Schwartz

Norbert Schwartz

In a study of consumer confidence in various offer types,  University of Michigan’s Y. Charles Zhang and Norbert Schwarz of University of Southern California reported that some recipients of precise offers viewed these proposals as “inflexible.

However, recipients of precise offers made more conciliatory counter-offers with smaller adjustments and more favorable final settlements.
Precise offers were associated with more favourable final deals even when the negotiator opened with a less ambitious precise offer.

Martin Schweinsberg

Martin Schweinsberg

Precise offers are less likely to be seen as “aggressive” by a co-negotiator, according to INSEAD’s Martin Schweinsberg collaborating with Gillian Ku and Madan M. Pillutla of London Business School’s and Cynthia S. Wang of Oklahoma State University.
This enables negotiators to present ambitious first offers while avoiding “offending” a negotiation partner and stalling progress toward settlement.

Gillian Ku

Gillian Ku

This risk of stalemated negotiation increases if negotiators see themselves in a lower-power position and receive an extreme offer.
These negotiators may be more willing to end negotiations,

Manoj Thomas

Manoj Thomas

Precise offers can obscure their actual value, noted Cornell’s Manoj Thomas and Vrinda Kadiyali with Daniel H. Simon of Indiana University.
Buyers underestimated the size of precise prices, particularly under uncertain conditions:  U.S. homebuyers paid more when list prices were precise.

Vrinda Kadiyali

Vrinda Kadiyali

Precise offers provide some of the benefits of favorably anchoring negotiation discussions while reducing risks of “offensive” extreme offers.

-*How effective have you found “precise” opening offers in achieving your negotiation goals?

RELATED POSTS:

©Kathryn Welds